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Third Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on
Environmental Law
Defeating Environmental Law: The Geology
of Legal Advantage
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.*
It is a singular honor to discuss issues of environmental law
at the Pace University School of Law. Lloyd K. Garrison, in whose
honor this lecture is named, was one of the great lawyers of his
time. Your Dean, Richard Ottinger, as a young member of Con-
gress a quarter century ago, was one of the first to raise issues of
environmental law. My immediate predecessor on this podium,
David Sive, is the most respected environmental lawyer in the
country. My debts to him are too numerous to mention. Your
faculty has also instructed me in many ways. To mention but two
outstanding individuals, no one working in the field can escape
the influence of Nicholas A. Robinson on the National Environ-
mental Policy Act or Jeffrey Miller on Clean Water Act
enforcement.
My talk today will: (1) introduce the metaphor of geology, (2)
suggest to you that complexity has "gainers" as well as "losers,"
and (3) show you how environmental laws can be defeated by
these twin engines of complexity and clever human adversaries.
I. The Metaphor of Geology
Complexity is the first word students and practitioners of en-
vironmental law learn. The primary reason for this is that envi-
Copyright © 1997 Pace University School of Law; William H. Rodgers, Jr.
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ronmental law is the result of an additive process where layer
upon layer is added to the preexisting strata as if guided by the
laws of geology. There are occasional reductions in this cumula-
tive mass (for example, the repealers that are featured in high
school civics classes), but they are far outnumbered by the addi-
tions, accretions, faults, folds, and fractures that mar the surface
and shape the deep content of this legal world. Graphic 11 in the
Appendix provides a small id of the roster of law that has piled up
in Columbia River law offices as fishing has declined. A similar
picture could be drawn for the Hudson River. Graphics of this
sort, however do not begin to reveal the displacements, seams, re-
versals, and exceptions that are buried in this law.
To elaborate further on this geological metaphor, Graphic 22
is a picture of the "Erosional History of the Appalachian Moun-
tains." It conveys nicely, the ridges, valleys, and fronts that can
develop due to uneven accumulations of geology. Graphic 33 de-
picts "Devonian Sedimentary Rocks of New York State." It clearly
demonstrates how deposit upon deposit from different ages make
up the whole.
II. The Practice of Advantage
In nature, social burdens are the unwelcome by-product of ac-
tivities that offer individual advantage. Nobody enjoys the com-
plexity of environmental laws, yet many gain from it.
It is not difficult to discern the primary beneficiaries of this
mass of complexity called environmental law. They are the law-
yers who use their guile to trace a satisfactory path down the
seam of Law A to its intersection with Law B, just below the sur-
face of Law C. They are the judges who impart their wisdom to
discern when Law 26 is impliedly repealed by Law 49. They are
the lawmakers who reap the benefits of cleaning up a river not
once, not twice, but three times with three different laws, and who
later reap the benefits of fashioning exemptions that permit es-
cape from the collective repression they created.
These environmental law people need not even be thankful to
the hand that feeds them. Environmental law itself, and the
mostly anonymous process that produces it, is a better scapegoat
than the Corps of Engineers. These fine lawyers can sneer at the
1. Copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Review.
2. Copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Review.
3. Copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Review.
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ambiguities while they seek to widen them, and these wise judges
can condemn the complexity while they add yet another layer to it.
Lawyers thrive on the complexity they pretend to despise be-
cause complexity multiplies opportunities for legal objection and
contention. It creates niches of advantage where unwelcome laws
can be ambushed, stifled, and avoided. It creates cracks and
seams into which fine legal differences can flow. The environmen-
tal laws have been damaged gravely by these predations. Several
legal tactics used to defeat these laws are defined in Attachment
1: (1) neglect, (2) diversion, (3) acquisition and sale, (4) abandon-
ment, (5) process transformation, (6) exception, (7) pretense, and
(8) marginalization. I will draw on examples from across the envi-
ronmental field but will focus primarily on the Pacific Northwest
where the great salmon have come under the "protection" of envi-
ronmental laws.
III. Tactics
A. Neglect: Law as Joke
Environmental literature is filled with references to legal di-
rections not taken, legal opportunities not exploited, and legal
commitments not remembered. 4 Agencies, for example, are em-
powered to choose the laws they will enforce. They can chart their
own course through the jumbled legal geologies erected in their
paths. But the power to choose also includes the discretion to dis-
regard. In the environmental field, this body of disregarded law is
so conspicuous that it has been given a name-"sleeper"-mean-
ing a law or rule that is forgotten, buried or ignored. 5 A conspicu-
ous reason for sleepers is that the responsible agency puts them to
bed as unworthy of attention. Sleepers are forever in danger of
4. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity
Promise: Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21
ENVTL. L. 657, 669-70 (1991) (Northwest Power Act); THE NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 111-15 (Joseph Cone & Sandy Ridlington eds., 1996) [here-
inafter 1996 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for
the Dynamic Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Revolution and the
Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); Peter Schuck, Legal Complex-
ity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992).
5. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of
Pandas' Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25
(1993); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lessons of the Red Squirrel: Consensus and Be-
trayal in the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 161 (1989);
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception
in the Evolution of the Environmental Statutes, 4 FLA. J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 377
(1989).
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slipping beneath the radar because there is little in them that
promises administrative advantage, and there is much in them
that creates discomfort. Some legal rules are not worth knowing
from the agency's perspective.
The Corps of Engineers has always selectively interpreted the
law. The Corps' most celebrated neglect in the environmental
field was its startlingly narrow reading of its power to forbid dis-
charges of refuse under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.6 The
Corps understood this law as ruling out only discharges that in
and of themselves obstructed navigation.
For three generations, into the Nixon Administration, dis-
chargers could pollute with impunity and destroy fish and ruin
spawning grounds. The only things they could not do, in the
Corps' view, was fill up the waterways with flammables that
might deter navigation. When this 1899 law was uncovered as an
anti-pollution weapon in the 1970s, it was described as a great
"sleeper" and was condemned for the surprises it contained. The
Corps of Engineers had administered the anesthesia.
Another unnoticed environmental law, effective since 1965, is
section 401 of the Clean Water Act, which affords considerable le-
gal leverage over dams by inviting states to determine whether a
project complies with state water quality standards. 7 These water
quality standards contain a number of provisions (e.g., minimum-
flow requirements, rapid fluctuation constraints) that are de-
signed to be "fish-friendly."8 A state's power to certify is the power
to say "no" to a project, which makes the law extremely valuable
as currency, even to those who are disposed more to selling it than
enforcing it. But this law was not sold; it was scrupulously ig-
nored even though it offered glory and fulfillment to lawyers
driven by ambition.
The legal dormancy of section 401 lasted for almost thirty
years, which is about as long as it takes for a generation of law-
yers who know nothing about environmental law to pass from the
scene.9 For whatever reason, legal entrepreneurs eventually dis-
covered section 401. It was thrust further into prominence by a
6. See 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER § 4.11
(1986).
7. See id., § 4.16 at 252-54.
8. See Debra L. Donohue, The Untapped Power of the Clean Water Act Section
401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201 (1996); Katherine Ransel, The Sleeping Giant Awakens:
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 25 ENV'rL. L. 255 (1995).
9. See T.S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed., 1970).
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1994 Supreme Court decision.' 0 Thus, section 401 is now back on
the legal monitor and part of sharply-contested territory. It is
threatened now not by desuetude but by an explicit repealer by an
antagonistic Congress.1 '
B. Diversion: Law as Specialty
The cracks and fissures of environmental laws enable law
managers to use their specialty and exploit the fissures to defeat
otherwise good intentions. The Columbia River salmon, for exam-
ple, have been destroyed by state water laws that are immune
from federal environmental laws and strategically placed to defeat
Indian treaty fishing rights. The crown jewel in this legal strategy
is the McCarren Amendment of 1953,12 which allows suits against
the United States (and by extension the tribes) in state courts "for
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system."' 3
On the Yakima River, a tributary to the Columbia, this law pro-
duced a grotesque rule for in-stream salmon protection known as
the bare minimum standard; it ensures that the fish have enough
water to maintain a precarious existence.' 4
Another legal offshoot on the Columbia River is the cleanup of
the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, described in legislative docu-
ments as the "largest civil works project ever undertaken."' 5 Pol-
10. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S.
700 (1994).
11. Section 401 was seriously damaged in the House-passed version of the Clean
Water Amendments of 1995, H.R. 961, 104th Cong. (1995) (colloquially known as the
"dirty water" bill). See BILL GHENT, ENVTL. & ENERGY INST., SPEC. STATUS REP.,
AWAITED SENATE CLEAN WATER BILL EXPECTED TO DIFFER FROM HOUSE VERSION 29
(1995).
12. 43 U.S.C.A. § 666 (1994), construed in Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
13. Compare Panel on Conjunctive Management: Idaho Water Policy in the Wake
of Musser, Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Water Policy & Sustainability in
the Columbia Basin, (May 19, 20, 1995), with DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 334-38 (3d ed. 1990) (elaborating on the McCarran Amendment).
14. See Order of the trial court in the Aquavella General Adjudication (Nov. 29,
1990); see id., the Flushing Flow Order (April 13, 1995); In re State of Washington
Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P. 2d 1306, 1310, 1325
(1993) (justifying loss of fishing rights by the payment of an Indian Claims Commis-
sion judgment; the measure of the right "is the minimum in-stream flow neces-
sary to maintain anadromous fish life in the river, according to annual prevailing
conditions").
15. STEVEN M. BLUSH & THOMAS H. HEITMAN, TRAIN WRECK ALONG THE RIVER OF
MONEY: AN EVALUATION OF THE HANFORD CLEANUP 1-1 (1995) (report prepared for the
U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources) [hereinafter 1995 TRAIN
WRECK STUDY ON HANFORD].
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luted soils and groundwater at Hanford are measured in cubic
miles. Many have written about this reservoir of pollution from
the bombmaking years, the magnitude and severity of which is
without planetary precedent. 16
The Indian tribes have an interest in this cleanup. The land-
scape, 560 square miles of it, is a source of game. It is also ex-
traordinarily rich in archaeological treasures and Indian artifacts.
Fish have thrived in the last free-flowing stretch of the river that
abuts the reservation. 17 However, leaking groundwater and loom-
ing tanks (approximately 177 apartment buildings in size) hold
the future of the river hostage. Protecting Indian fishing was not
the principal business at Hanford, and it is not the chief aim of the
cleanup.' 8 The immediate problem is whether the cleanup will
come to resemble fenced-off permanent pollution zones. Some ar-
eas of Hanford cannot possibly be upgraded to meet the require-
ments for future residential or commercial use. The Department
of Energy thus is promoting a recreational use standard that
would limit fishermen to river access fifty-five days of the year.
The diversion point that consigns challenges to the Hanford
cleanup to some legally distant Pluto is section 113(h) of the
16. See, e.g., M. D'ANToNIO, ATOMIC HARVEST: HANFORD AND THE LEGAL TOLL OF
AMERICA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL (1993); Paul Wilson, "Cold War Legacy - Hanford," in
Natural Resources Law Institute, Northwestern, School of Law, 5 NRLI News 1, 4
(June 1994) (nearly two-thirds of the nation's high-level radioactive waste is found at
Hanford; in the period of peak operation (mid-50s to mid-60s), Hanford was running
eight single-pass nuclear reactors whose sole job was to convert uranium to pluto-
nium; altogether, the government produced 53,000 kilograms of plutonium for the
weapons program at Hanford).
17. See Shauna Whidden Study Paper, The Hanford Reach: Protecting the Colum-
bia's Last Safe Haven for Salmon, (Northwest Water Law & Policy Project), Nw. SCH.
L. OF LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE, (1995).
18. The risk-assessments that are being done by the Department of Energy are
nine-parts deception. See 1995 TRAIN WRECK STUDY ON HANFORD, supra note 15, at 8-
9. This is before any correction is made for the embarrassing fact that the Indians
along the river consume fish at a rate 6-8-10 times that of the norm used in EPA risk
assessments. See COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM'N, Press Release, Oct. 7,
1994, Study Reveals Columbia River Tribal Members May Be Exposed to Higher
Levels of Dioxin and Other Toxics. This disparity between Indian and non-Indian fish
consumption is so well known that it received mention in President Clinton's 1994
Executive Order on Environmental Justice. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg.
7629 (1994) ("Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Popula-
tions and Low-Income Populations"). Few expect that abstractions such as the health
of Indians will greatly influence cleanup budgets measured in the billions of dollars.
On the work of the Department of Energy, see BIJNE HARDEN, A RIVER LOST:
THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE COLUMBIA ch. 8 (1996) ("Wild and Scenic Atomic River");
Gerald F. Hess, Hanford: Cleaning Up the Most Contaminated Place in the United
States, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 105 (1996).
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Superfund law. 19 Section 113(h) declares lawsuits that deal with
disputes over cleanups must await completion of construction ac-
tivities. In the case of Hanford, this eagerly anticipated date, bar-
ring extensions, might be: 2018, when some units are supposed to
be cleaned up; 2055, when reactor cores are supposed to be re-
moved; or it might be 2118, 121 years from the present, when un-
restricted use of land and groundwater is to be achieved. 20
In effect, tribes must wait fifty or sixty years before they are
permitted to go before a judge to argue about a risk assessment,
which is mostly a figment of scientific imagination, to obtain relief
that consists merely of rearranging future and law of this sort and
pure farce.
C. Acquisitions and Sale: Law as Currency
1. Selling Salmon Protection
There was nothing inherently wrong with Washington's pre-
statehood salmon-protection laws dating 1881. They required
fishways or other means of passage to overcome obstructions in
streams used by anadromous fish. The wrong came when the au-
thorities presumed to sell or trade this power to say "no." This
ready disposition to make fish-protection negotiable was facili-
tated by the win-win ideologies of the day. It was underwritten by
the convenient fiction that hatcheries were a satisfactory recom-
pense for natural stocks. But the law made these transactions
stick, not by encouraging the de facto sales of natural fish runs,
but by declaring that the buyer who succeeded in corrupting the
process acquired a property right that could not be taken back.
This power of the transaction to rechannel evolutionary histo-
ries and to penetrate into the distant future is being played out
today on the Elwha River. 21 Thus, politicians sit in solemn judg-
ment to decide whether $29.5 million should be paid to benefi-
ciaries of the current dam owners. 22 It made no sense to sell these
19. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (1994). See also, 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTE & SUBSTANCES § 8.3, at 509-11 (1992).
20. See 1995 TRAIN WRECK STUDY ON HANFORD, supra note 15, at 1-19, 1-45, 46;
See id. at 125 ("the EPA and Ecology have adopted a schedule of cleanup for the 100
areas that is at least a hundred years longer than the schedule in the [Tripartite
Agreement] for cleanup of all operable units at the site") (emphasis added). See id.
21. See BRUCE BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD
SALMON ch. 6 (1982).
22. The payments are to be made to the "beneficiaries" because it is not even
known who is the "owner" of the Elwha Dam. This is claimed to be "confidential."
Interview with Russ Busch, Seattle attorney, (Jan. 1997). Compare Elwha River
2002] 693
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great fish runs in 1910. It made no sense to protect the intrusion
in 1992 by promising extravagant compensation by law as if it
were some inescapable constitutional obligation. The only out-
come that makes less sense would be to leave the dams in the
river because the constitutional duty contrived by lawyers has be-
come too expensive.
This problem of purchased law is no small or parochial thing.
The licensing process of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) has left many bargained-for properties in the rivers
with fifty-year licenses being the legal norm. Firm properties also
have been erected under the tolerant auspices of FERC. The
worst giveaways are protected into the distant future because the
law transforms bureaucratic trepidation into constitutionally pro-
tected property.
Selling the Protection of Endangered Species
The latest law for sale is frequently referred to as the strong-
est environmental law in the United States. Section 9 of the En-
dangered Species Act (Act) makes it a crime to "take" any
protected species. 23 This statute is powerful because it is possible
to "take" with the weapons of environmental damage, and it ap-
ples to private as well as public owners. The most impressive vis-
ual image of Section 9 is the picture of the famous owl circles on
the Plum Creek Timber property in the mid-Cascades (Graphic 4,
"Owl Circles on Plum Creek Timber Proper"). 24 These circles re-
present all of the places that cannot be logged.
Section 9 finds itself for sale and auction because Section 10 of
the Act permits the "incidental" taking of protected species if the
landowner is committed to a "habitat conservations plan" that of-
Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, Pub. Law No. 102-495, 106 Stat. 3173 (Oct.
24, 1992) with Letter to the Editor from Senator Slade Gorton, There are other Na-
tional Parks Projects That Need Federal Money, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb.
16, 1997, at C2 ("Before we can remove the Elwha dams, we must acquire them. To
acquire them will cost $29.5 million. To spend that amount of money in a single year
means that the Elwha dams nation's park land acquisition.... [This would be] unfair
to other states [and explains why] I have appropriated $4 million [in each of the last
two years] toward the acquisition of the Elwha dams."). Id.
23. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538(a)(1)(A)-(G), § 9(a)(1)(A)-(G) (1994). See also WILLIAM
H. RODGERS, JR., HORNBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1016-21 (2d ed., 1994) [herein-
after 1994 HORNBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
24. See James A. Kraft, Plum Creek Timber Co., "Large Landowner: Plum Creek
HCP," Law Seminars International, Program on the Endangered Species Act, Jan. 30-
31, 1997 (Meydenbauer Center, Bellevue, Wash.). Copy of Graphic 4 on file with Pace
Environmental Law Review.
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fers some protection for a listed species. 25 Like the FERC lawyers
before them, who perfected a variety of hatchery fictions to justify
their "incidental" intrusions, attorneys for the timber companies
now proudly come forth with imaginative sustainable practices
that will protect the owls and the fish into the distant future if
made part of an acceptable deal. 26 Like the FERC attorneys
before them, these attorneys justify their predictions on their own
satisfaction with state-of-the-art modeling and impressive graph-
ics. Like the FERC lawyers before them, these attorneys insist
that there can be no deals without the certainty afforded by long-
term properties, meaning that habitat conservation plans can ex-
tend for 100 to 150 years. 27 Like the FERC lawyers before them,
this new generation of attorneys who write habitat conservation
plans is confident that changed attitudes, goodwill and modern
education can defeat any small limitations in anticipating the
needs of the fish in the creative documents they write.
However, the negotiators who specialize in habitat conserva-
tion plans for endangered species have one bargaining chip that
the FERC licensees lack. They are empowered to destroy habitat
and limit the options for the fish while negotiations proceed. They
can do this because they already own the habitat that is an issue,
whereas the dam makers only hope to own it. Routinely, these
landowners say that business necessities counsel the avoidance of
an infestation by endangered species. Landowners search for en-
dangered species, not to protect them but to find places where
they are not. This is the land that then can be harvested, modi-
fied, or transformed.
Nevertheless, it is the prevailing view that habitat conserva-
tion plans are one of the great hopes for saving the salmon, just as
FERC licenses were previously thought to be. They embody a
spirit of tolerance extended to kills that are merely incidental, cre-
ate nonnegotiable properties projected into a distant future, and
are sustained by a win-win ideology. Finally, they are justified by
optimism that protecting the fish requires only marginal improve-
25. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994). See also, 1994 HORNBOOK ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW, supra note 23, at 1020-21.
26. See Law Seminars International, Program on the Endangered Species Act
(Jan. 30-31 1997) (Meydenbauer Center, Bellevue, Wash.) (presentations of Jeffry B.
Van Duzer, Esq., Davis Wright Tremaine, Curt Smitch, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
James A. Kraft, Esq., Plum Creek Timber Co., Jan Pauw, Esq., Weyerhaeuser Co.).
27. Jan Pauw, Senior Legal Counsel, Weyerhaeuser Co., ESA Litigation Risks:
How Do They Affect Landowner Behavior and How Can They Best Be Managed? Pro-
gram on the Endangered Species Act.
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ments in caution. We will not know until well into the twenty-
first century whether this wave of optimism probes to be so firmly
grounded.
D. Abandonment: Law as Liability
It is intuitively difficult to explain why an agency might opt
for trading or abandoning a powerful law while cherishing or hon-
oring a weak one. But one reason why this abandonment occurs is
that enforcing powerful laws such as the no-take provision of the
Endangered Species Act can inspire resistance and backlash.
Such costs can more than offset the gains in jurisdictional
authority.
One strong salmon-protector in the legal arsenal that the flow
of events quietly shelved is the Washington Hydraulics Law, first
enacted in 1943.28 Fortuitously, perhaps, this law had a substan-
tial advantage over later (1972) amendments to the federal Clean
Water Act. It focused on the key parameters of hydrological con-
tinuity and stream bed integrity, not just water quality.29
Those who believe that weak statutes have killed salmon
should peruse the hydraulics law. It says that those who propose
to "divert" or "change" the "natural flow or bed" of any river or
stream must win the endorsement of the fisheries authorities.
They must extend "written approval" of "the adequacy" of the
means outlined for the "protection of fish life." Violators are guilty
of a gross misdemeanor. Their illegal projects are declared "public
nuisances" subject to abatement.
Courageous fish and game staffers fought hundreds of battles
in Washington State under the hydraulics law. They challenged
violators and counseled cooperators who planned their work
around the return of the salmon. They won a few prosecutors to
the cause. They flexed this legal weapon like none other in the
pre-fisheries arsenal, and they won some of their battles.
But the strength and the breadth of the hydraulics law was
its own undoing. Agency staffers gradually found themselves
awash in a sea of salmon crime. They learned the same lesson as
the administrators of the no-discharge provisions of the Refuse
28. 1943 WASH. LAwS 40; see also Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administra-
tive Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647 (1991).
29. See, e.g., Janet N. Abramowitz, Sustaining Freshwater Ecosystems, World-
watch Institute, State of the World Report 60 (1996); see also Center for Streamside
Studies, College for Forest Resources, College of Ocean & Fishery Sciences, Univer-
sity of Washington, 7th Annual Review (Jan. 30 1997).
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Act and the enforcers of the no-take provisions of the Endangered
Species Act. They discovered that when violations mount, when
offenders are one's neighbors, and when crime becomes the norm,
the problem is not with the behavior. The problem is with the
law.
One study by the Washington Department of Fisheries (De-
partment) in 1975 catalogued over 10,000 streams in the Puget
Sound area alone, with this fish habitat covering almost one quar-
ter of the land area of Washington State. The study warned that
"salmon production habitat is being lost at an accelerating rate.30
If this trend is not changed in the near future, the natural salmon
populations will decline faster than they can be replaced by artifi-
cially produced fish."31 The causes for the hydraulics law nullifi-
cation were the common culprits of benign ignorance and rank
favoritism. Thus, said the Department, one of the biggest
problems in administering the law "is a lack of awareness on part
of private individual[s], private corporations, and public agencies.
Most are not aware that a permit is required to work in a stream.
Most are unfamiliar with the types of restrictions that are placed
on hydraulics projects, and many don't even know if fish use oc-
curs in the stream involved."32 As for prosecutions, said the De-
partment, a reoccurring problem is the attitude of the local courts
when the Department attempts to prosecute a hydraulics viola-
tion. Convictions are rarely obtained. When they are, the penal-
ties are usually so low that they provide little if any deterrent to
future violations. 33
But the problems run deeper than ignorance and indifference.
State legislators constantly harped on hydraulics law enforce-
ment, which touched their constituents. The law was amended
frequently to accommodate those whose inconveniences carried
legislative weight. Enforcement often came up against their sister
agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, that made a
business of disrupting culverts and modifying streams. Indeed,
hydraulics law enforcement became an issue within the Depart-
ments of Fisheries and Game themselves as the hatchery folks
and stream rehabilitation types when about the business of ren-
dering the streams more congenial to their ambitions.
30. WASHINGTON DEPT. OF FISHERIES, A CATALOG OF WASHINGTON STREAMS (1975)
31. See id.
32. Id. at 2.
33. See id. at 1-2.
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No date can be marked as the moment hydraulics law enforce-
ment was abandoned to the vandals who were bringing civiliza-
tion down upon the salmon. State enforcers, though, like Indians
who wanted to save the fish, gradually were overcome by forces
that never relaxed. The hydraulics law enforcers gave way before
the cumulative effort of the gravel removers, water diverters,
pipeline builders, and culvert designers.
The hydraulics law was no unwelcome sleeper. It was no rude
intruder into the mission of fish-protecting agencies. There was a
will to enforce, but no way to do it. Regulation never works in the
face of massive resistance. Those who are called upon to do the job
will abandon the effort when the pain becomes too great, leaving a
law that is false and hollow.
E. Process Transformation: Law as Attrition
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)34 is com-
monly regarded as the most significant environmental law on the
planet. It has been copied worldwide, and its inspiration is said to
extend to the laws of 150 nations.35 NEPA has a strong process
component. It requires federal agencies to study the effects of
their actions, alternatives, and mitigation measures. But nobody
ever said that NEPA was concerned solely with process. At least,
nobody said that until the Supreme Court put its stamp on the
law.
In a series of twelve decisions in the 1970s and '80s, the high
court slowly squeezed the life out of this law. These decisions cov-
ered twenty-two separate legal issues.36 The effort culminated in
a unanimous 1989 decision announcing that the United States
Forest Service could approve a new town-sized ski resort at Sandy
Butte in the Methow Valley within the Columbia River watershed.
This project could go ahead even if the result was total destruction
of a herd of 30,000 mule deer that frequented the area. "In this
case," said the Court, "it would not have violated NEPA if the For-
est Service, after complying with the Act's procedural require-
ments, had decided that the benefits to be derived from downhill
skiing at Sandy Butte justified the issuance of a special use per-
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (1969).
35. Interview with Nicholas A. Robinson, Professor at Pace University School of
Law (Apr. 1997).
36. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimickry and Recruitment in
Environmental Law, 20 ENV'L. L. 495 (1990).
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mit, notwithstanding the loss of fifteen percent, fifty percent, or
even one-hundred percent of the mule deer herd."37
A high court content with the destruction of deer might be
similarly content with the destruction of fish. But there is more to
this tale than the obvious inference that the Supreme Court is
careless about its own form-over-substance ruminations. The
agencies and the lawyers that served them worked hard to make
NEPA compatible in their ways. The cases brought to the Su-
preme Court were tactically and serially aligned to produce a law
that became all process and no substance. The justices them-
selves are closely attuned to-indeed they are selected for-an
ideology of judicial restraint that finds satisfaction in the superfi-
cialities of process. Legal academics have claimed that justice is
process, and nothing else,38 while the law business thrives on this
bumper crop of legal motion.
NEPA has generated industries of impact assessment. But
the process is so thoroughly neutral and so completely oblivious to
result that those who resort to its use are not the protectors of the
fish, but fish despoilers who say their rights were insufficiently
weighed. Indeed, the one dam in the entire Northwest that has
been mostly thoroughly studied under NEPA is not one of the fish-
killers at Bonneville, or at Umatilla. It is on the Elwha River
where the action challenged is not the deed that removed the bet-
ter part of ten separate runs of these great fish from the face of the
Earth. This hard and relentless process has come down on the
proposal to remove the dams and restore the fish if that can be
done. 39
F. Exception: Law as Contingency
The Clean Water Act (CWA)40 is considered one of the success
stories of environmental law, but it has not been immune from the
historical accidents that send law into empty orbits from which
there is no escape. The CWA drew a distinction between "point
37. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
38. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
39. Compare Oregon Natural Resources Council, 15 Damnable Dams (1994) (dis-
cussing the region's most destructive dams), with U.S. Department of Interior, Na-
tional Park Service, Elwha River Ecosystem Restoration Implementation (Draft EIS
April, 1996) (for the best studied dam) and Final Environmental Impact Statement
(Nov. 1996).
40. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT §§ 101-607, U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1995) [hereinafter CWA].
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sources" that were strongly regulated and "nonpoint sources" that
were primarily overlooked. In the CWA's major rewrite of 1972, a
few powerful interests-irrigators among them-succeeded in get-
ting their particular conveyances of pollution excluded from the
category of "point source."41 The dam builders and dam operators
followed a more circuitous route.
In 1973, Alan G. Kirk, then the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) Acting Assistant Administrator for Enforcement
and General Counsel, wrote a letter announcing that dams were
not "point sources." 42 He had fired the first round in a ten-year
legal campaign that would confirm his conviction that dams
should not be brought under the stringent supervision of the per-
mit process.
It was difficult for the EPA to let the dams go free. The key to
a legal understanding of a point source is that somebody is respon-
sible, and that something can be done to avoid the damage. The
dams were good candidates on this score. The formal definition of
a point source includes any "pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, con-
duit."43 These dams were teeming with penstocks, pipes, chan-
nels, and ditches that brought unhappiness to the fish. 44 The law
said that point sources must be responsible for the addition of pol-
lutants to navigable waters. Gas bubble disease looked suspi-
ciously like water passing over a structure where it takes on
atmospheric gases that work their damage when added to the
pools below. The EPA staffers knew in the 1970s that gas bubble
disease was responsible for the largest fish kill in Missouri his-
tory: 421,000 fish. It happened below the Corps-built Harry S.
Truman Dam on the Osage River. The EPA staffers were told
that the Columbia River, the dams, if kept immune from law,
would kill two million salmon and steelhead between 1976 and
2000.45
But the law overcame all of these troubling signs for dam
owners. The environmental law experts for the Justice Depart-
41. Presently exempted from the definition of "point source" are "agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture." CWA § 502 (14),
33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14) (1994). Some materials, including well injections in oil and
gas operations, are exempted from the definition of"pollutant." See id. § 1362(6).
42. Quoted in Brief for Federal Appellant 35, National Wildlife Federation v. Gor-
such, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, June 1981.
43. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
44. See supra note 41, § 1362(14).
45. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
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ment argued 46 that the two million dams would represent a 28-
fold increase in the number of facilities regulated. They said that
the dams did not discharge anything, reasoning that navigable
water cannot discharge pollutants into itself.47 They declared
that the pollution from these dams was a natural phenomenon. 48
They demanded that great deference be accorded to this expert
agency-an agency that soon had several members of its executive
team in prison or under investigation for corruption.49
Judge Patricia Wald wrote the judicial opinion that made
these wishes come true.50 The strongest environmentalist to sit
on the D.C. Circuit in the last twenty years, Judge Wald wrote a
beautiful essay on why courts should defer to the EPA. Her opin-
ion is a famous monument in the history of environmental law,
and its elegant expressions grace law school casebooks. But it did
not help the fish. It did not help the Indians. Still, it was a fine
and memorable legal moment.
In law, as in other human endeavors, there is frequently no
turning back. The courts said that dams were not point sources.
This triggered the contingency that soon became frozen into cer-
tainty. The prospect that dams are point sources will not be revis-
ited. No informed lawyer today believes otherwise.
Those who think wistfully of these legal might-have-beens
can renourish their regrets when they read the 1993 Snake River
Salmon Recovery Plan. Found there are the generic fishway crite-
ria that might have been applied and enforced against the dams.5 1
These criteria include rules on elevation between the pools, water
level differentials between adjacent weirs, fishway channel veloci-
ties, and debris conditions at ladder exits. Inspections by the
Corps biologists show "out-of-criteria" conditions for the following
percentages of inspections at the eight mainstream dams on the
Columbia River: Bonneville, 65%; the Dalles, 30%; John Day, 33%;
McNary, 41%; Ice Harbor 52%; Lower Monumental, 86%; Little
Goose, 100%; and Lower Granite, 44%.52 These gross violations
might have been avoided by a permit. Fish will die in these condi-
46. See supra text accompanying note 42.
47. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175.
48. See id. at 178.
49. See 3 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDE & Toxic
SUBSTANCES, § 7.2 at 532-33 (1988).
50. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175.
51. See Snake River Recovery Team, Recommendation Prepared for Peer Review
XI-6 (Oct. 1993).
52. See id., at XI-7 (weekly inspections by COE biologists in 1988).
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tions. But we know with legal certitude that they will not die from
the "addition" of "pollutants: from a "point source."
G. Pretense: Law as Pontification and Mythology
Environmental laws are filled with empty threat. Some of
these are designed to be mere postulations. Others had emptiness
thrust upon them. Law serves nicely as a source of moral pro-
nouncement. It serves, too, as the resting place for the self-decep-
tions and hopes that accumulate in this written record of social
ambition.
Congress made its most famous moral pronouncement in the
Clean Water Act in 1972 when it said that all discharges into nav-
igable waters shall cease by 1985. 53 The lawmakers meant by this
not that all pollution shall cease by 1985 but that those deliber-
ately dumping poisons into the water-that is, the point sources-
would have thirteen years to stop.5 4 Some courts read this "no
discharge" pronouncement as an indication that less pollution
should be preferred to more.55
But this form of mild accommodation is insufficient for the
angry ideologies lightly trained in economics who now populate
the federal appellate courts. It was to this constituency that
Judge Patrica Wald spoke in her decision excusing the dams from
their point-source burdens. Of the "no-discharge" goal, she ex-
plained that Congress thought it was unenforceable. It was not
based on refined cost estimates. It was quite possibly "beyond the
ability of the American people to absorb the cost."5 6
Congress frequently says that costs and benefits should be
carefully weighed when saving the fish.57 When Congress speaks,
courts do not rush forth to brush aside the advise as morally bank-
rupt or ecologically unacceptable. Judge Wald's remarks are a
small aside and long forgotten. But they serve as a reminder that
the courts are the keepers of legal myths. They choose to tell us
that subscribers to the myth of no-pollution must be exposed as
53. See CWA § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). ("It is the national goal that the
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985"); John
Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990).
54. See 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER § 1.3, at
19-21 (1986).
55. See id.
56. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 181.
57. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and
Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
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hypocrites. But the myth of cost-benefit analysis is a prerogative
of Congress.
In another illustration, the CWA declares that the discharge
of pollutants from sewage treatment plants shall achieve secon-
dary treatment by July 1, 1977.58 But raw sewage overflows make
regular appearances without legal consequence if (as they fre-
quently are) combined with stormwater. These are called com-
bined storrnwater overflow (CSO) events. This practice appeared
to be legally vulnerable when the City of Portland received its dis-
charge permit requiring that the city maintain water quality stan-
dards. It is not possible to have a CSO event without violating the
water quality standard for fecal coliform. 59 But to the rescue
came the judges, reviving a twenty-year-old technicality in the
law, who announced that citizens could not enforce this obligation
because it was a "water quality standard" and not an "effluent
limitation."60 This small product judicial sabotage may yet be
overcome, 6 1 and the moment celebrated as a great environmental
victory. But the loss is entirely self-inflicted and fully the product
of a point of view that sheds no tears over empty law. Our legal
system expends effort daily on a litany of occult methodology of no
discernable benefit to the fish or the people who rely on them.
International environmental law is pathetically bereft of en-
forcement, but most law students do not know this when they
study the famous Trail Smelter62 case that announces the intui-
tively satisfying rule that states "must answer for environmental
harm" to people of other nations caused by activities within the
territories. 63 The Trail Smelter case, which went ahead in the
1930s and '40s, allowed recovery in an arbitration proceeding for
damage to Washington residents from smelter fumes originating
in Canada. But the practical problem is that forums to press
58. See CWA § 301(b)(1)(A). The deadline was extended later to July 1988. PERCI-
VAL ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 888 (2d ed.,
1986).
59. Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of Portland, 11 F.3d 900, 906-911
(9th Cir. 1993), withdrawn and vacated on rehearing 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995).
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941).
63. U.S. v. Canada, 3 U.N. Rep. Int. Arb. Awards 1911 (1941). Compare R.
Pisillo-Mazzeschi, Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental Harm, in
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 15 (F. Francioni & T.
Scovazzi eds., 1991), quoted in L.D. GuRuswAMY, SIR JEFFREY ORDER: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 332, 333 (West Publishing Co., 1994) with Trail Smelter Arbi-
tration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1963-81 (1941).
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these claims are generally unavailable. Law students who believe
what they read about the Trail Smelter case should go to the Col-
ville Reservation, and travel by boat around Lake Roosevelt,
where they will observe miles of curious black sand hugging the
shoreline. These images represent the sludge discharges from the
same smelter that was the subject of the pro-environmental rul-
ings in the 1940s. Students will hear of the toxins slowly accumu-
lating in the fish that were made permanent residents by the
Grand Coulee Dam. These residues are the products of the
smelter at Trail and of the pulp mill at Sellgard, B.C. that pour
their wastes into the lake below from which there is no escape.
The Colville Tribe is a proud people. Their lawyers are second
to none. They do not fear lawsuits. They know what is at stake.
They understand what the law promises them. They are helpless,
because this law exists only in the minds of reporters.
The last example of environmental law that is missing in
practice on the Columbia River is section 303(d) of the CWA.
Since 1972, this law has required states to identify so-called water
quality limited segments-stream stretches where point source
controls are insufficient to protect water quality.64 These are
streams ruined by the logging, mining, grazing, agriculture, irri-
gation and damming of which many studies speak.65 The 1972
law anticipated that the listings would be followed by the develop-
ment of state plans to limit the contributions of the responsible
parties (called "total maximum daily loads")66 so that compliance
could be achieved.
But none of this happened until the nullification was brought
to a halt by a series of court orders in the early 1990s requiring
the EPA to take over the listing duties.67 Thus, while the offend-
64. See 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER, § 4.18 at
281-85 (1986).
65. See, e.g., Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River: Restoration of
Salmonid Fisheries in the Columbia River Ecosystem, passim (Sept. 10, 1996) (Devel-
opment of an Alternative Conceptual Foundation and Review and Synthesis of Sci-
ence Underlying the Columbia River Basin Fish & Wildlife Program); 1996 NRC
Upstream Study; 1997 Study on Pacific Salmon & Their Ecosystems.
66. See Idaho Sportmen's Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962, 965 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 26, 1996).
67. See Rodgers, supra note 64, at 281-85; see also Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v.
Browner, 43 FRC 1289, 1996 WL 710883 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 1996), (Dwyer J.)
(taking up enforcement of TMDLs for the streams in Idaho; this case explains that
Idaho submitted no water quality limited segment list to the EPA until 1989, seven-
teen years after enactment of the 1972 Amendments, and ten years after the statu-
tory due date; in this case, the EPA is proposing a schedule to develop all necessary
TMDLs by 2021, which an intervening industry group "Clean Water for Idaho," chal-
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ers merely stand by awaiting their legal fate, the waterbodies they
destroy are placed upon a rapidly-growing casualty list. In 1993-
94, the EPA had listed no more than 100 stream segments in the
Northwest states; in early 1997, the numbers have ballooned to
2500-3000 streams in trouble.68 The listing, of course, is but prep-
aration for some distant day of legal reckoning, although many
fear the fish will not be here to celebrate it.
There are many reasons why law does not happen. The fish
do not understand these reasons. Only human satisfaction blinks
on or shuts down when these laws come alive or go inert. Laws
that do not deliver benefits directly to the fish do not deserve to be
called environmental laws. They should be called pretended law.
H. Marginization: Law as Scapegoat
1. Individually Identifiable Pinnipeds
No better example of environmental law gone bad, can be
found than the six dense pages of the 1994 Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act.69 This law makes exceptions to the general protection
of marine mammals. It invites a state to apply to the Secretary of
Commerce to authorize "the intentional lethal taking" of "individ-
ually identifiable pinnipeds" that have a "significant negative im-
pact" on certain salmonid fishery stocks.70 The fisheries stocks
protected are those that are endangered or threatened or those
that "migrate through the Ballard Locks at Seattle,
Washington."71
This law has all the trappings of modern environmental law.
It includes particularized public notice and input requirements, 72
and scrapes of cost-benefit analysis. There must be a "detailed
description of the problem of interaction and expected benefits of
the taking."73 This law also has a splendid advisory mechanism
lenges as unreasonably hasty; the court disapproved this casual quarter-century allo-
cated to development of the tool for compliance (which is not the same thing as
compliance; it holds that the year 2021 was capricious as too slow, and remands for
the choice of another date while recommending five years as reasonable).
68. See Chuck Clarke, Regional Administrator, EPA, Region X, "Can we integrate
the ESA and the Clean Water Act?" Law Seminars International, Conference on the
Endangered Species Act, Jan. 30-31, 1997 Bellevue, Wash.
69. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
70. Id.
71. Id. at § 120(b)(1).
72. Applications to take are to include "a means of identifying the individual pin-
niped or pinnipeds." Id. at § 120(b)(2).
73. Id.
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that would satisfy the most demanding of political scientists. It
establishes a Pinneped-Fishery Interaction Task Force that in-
cludes representation from every conceivable interest group in-
cluding the Indian treaty tribes, conservation and fishing
groups.74
This law expects the very best of science. It calls for scientific
representation of the Task Force. 75 It specifies scientific factors to
be written into the legal criteria; decisionmakers are to weigh "the
extent to which such pinnipeds are causing undue injury or im-
pact to, or imbalance with, other species in the ecosystem, includ-
ing fish populations."7 6  It requires the use of scientific
methodology, including non-lethal alternatives, to be evaluated af-
ter implementation in accordance with the wise dictates of adap-
tive management. 77
There is considerable biology bound up in this "nuisance pin-
niped" law. Much of it is inattentive to Darwin. The fish-run fore-
most in the minds of these lawmakers is the steelhead run that
passes through the Corps-managed Ballard Locks that connect
freshwater Lake Washington on the eastern side of Seattle with
saltwater Puget Sound on the west. Historically, the Locks did
not exist. Nor did the steelhead run now passing through it. No
one knows precisely the pedigree of the fish, although suspicions
have been raised by genetic tests showing traces of stocks
originating in the McLoud River, California. This is where Living-
ston Stone established his first West Coast hatchery. The reason
this law undertook to protect the fish that "migrate through the
Ballard Locks" in Seattle is that these fish were thought to lack
the biological significance that would justify listing and protection
under the Endangered Species Act.
A second curious feature of this "nuisance pinniped" law is its
focus on "individually identifiable pinnipeds" that were perceived
to be making life difficult for the steelhead at the Locks. This bad-
actor or deviancy theory may have some credence for humans
trapped in unpromising environments. 7 But who could imagine
that a predation strategy that worked for sea lion A would not be
74. See id.
75. See id. at § 120(c)(2).
76. Id. at § 120(d)(3).
77. See id. at § 120(c)(5).
78. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL-WHY WE ARE THE WAY WE ARE:
THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 222 (1994) (pointing out that Mar-
tin Daly and Margo Wilson have argued that the "short time horizons" for which
criminals are famous may be an "adaptive response to the predictive information
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immediately exploited by sea lion B if the opportunity arose? Who
could presume that the cornering of steelhead was a specialized
knowledge of a sea lion underworld? Only staffers and members
of Congress who know nothing of Darwin, but who prefer to be-
lieve that pinniped extirpation is but a selective removal opera-
tion akin to taking a few criminals off the streets.
2. The Biology of Scapegoats
The strongest biology in this "nuisance pinniped" law is
human behavior. It is also the least admirable. Since 1980, trig-
germen of one sort of another have shot 254 seals and sea lions in
the waters of the Puget Sound.79 We do not know but can only
suspect that most of the damage was done not by honest fisher-
men but by poachers and vandals who find gratification in the
pain they inflict. Only the 255th execution on this list was author-
ized by law, and the motivation for this act was not to punish a
pinniped but to save the steelhead run that pass through the Bal-
lard Locks.
It takes a highly selective thinker to believe that sea lion pre-
dation is the key to survival of the winter steelhead run at the
Ballard Locks, which is the subject to the usual confounding forces
that besiege all anadromous fish on land at sea. See Graphic 5,80
"What Are the Influences on Decline of Winter Steelhead Run at
the Ballard Locks?" But a scapegoat frequently emerges in
human affairs because it fulfills precisely this purpose of selective
focus, and of assigning blame and exacting retribution.8' The
scapegoat serves as an imagined solution to a real problem.
This brings the bad-actor theory of the "nuisance pinniped"
law into better focus. The California sea lions that brought atten-
tion to the steelhead at the Ballard Locks were excellent scape-
goats. They had recently arrived in the Puget Sound area-a
legal by-product, some said, of the pro-pinniped sentiments bound
up in the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1970. They were na-
about one's prospects for longevity and eventual success"), citing M. Daly & M. Wil-
son, Homicide (1988).
79. See data presented at Conference on Pacific Salmon & Their Ecosystems: Sta-
tus and Future Options, Jan. 10-12, 1994.
80. Copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Review.
81. See, e.g., MICHAEL SHERMER, WHY PEOPLE BELIEVE WEIRD THINGS: PSEUDOSCI-
ENCE, SUPERSTITION, AND OTHER CONFUSIONS OF OUR TIME ch. 7 (1997) ("Epidemics of
Accusations: Medieval and Modern Witch Crazes"). Among the editorial for execu-
tion, see Don Hannula, A Foul Wind of California Hypocrisy Over Sea Lions, SEATTLE
TIMES, March 28, 1996, at B4.
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tive to California, which counts for two strikes in Washington.
They were all male, another debit that made most of them biologi-
cally superfluous.8 2 And they ate fish in plain view, which
stripped them of the pretense of innocence enjoyed by other of-
fenders who did their steelhead malefactions in the anonymity of
the high seas. It was easy enough for public opinion to saddle
these proven killers with rumors of wrongs unconfirmed. These
sea lions, it was believed, preferred heads, not the fillets of the
fish. These wanton connoisseurs were suspected of killing eight or
ten instead of one fully consumed.
If the "nuisance pinniped" law was not designed to be a scape-
goat law, it soon became one. These troublesome sea lions who
gathered at the Ballard Locks were given a name-"Hershel" was
the moniker. In the early days, "Hershel" was a generic name ap-
plied to several of the sea lions who enjoyed the steelhead diet
available at the Locks. But one "Hershel" soon emerged as the
leader of the Hershels. He secured his reputation in the winter of
1993-94 when observers blamed him for consuming 60% of the
dwindling steelhead run. He was given a name-Hondo, No. 17
by a biologist and longtime Boston Celtics fan and admirer of a
great player from an earlier era, John Havlicek. Like the Hav-
licek of old, sea lion No.17 overwhelmed the defense set before
him. Stopping him became a personal thing.
Eventually, Hondo, No. 17, would take the blame for the de-
cline in the Ballard Locks Winter Steelhead Run. He would be the
255th victim in the war against pinnipeds that is now being
waged in the name of the salmon. But he would be given every
legal chance. He would enjoy the finest due process environmen-
tal law has to offer. He would hear the best of science brought to
bear on his case. He would be the beneficiary of an exacting exer-
cise in adaptive management.
3. NEPA's Due Process
The National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) was one of the
first laws brought to bear to Hondo's advantage. It required care-
fully assessing the effects and evaluating the alternatives before
undertaking a major action such sea lion removal. The National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) wrote a meticulous and bal-
anced document explaining why removing sea lions would help
82. On animals "superfluous" to breeding, see COLIN TuDGE, LAST ANIMALS AT THE
Zoo: How MASs EXTINCTION CAN BE STOPPED 1, 84 (1992).
708 [Vol. 19
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/10
THE GEOLOGY OF LEGAL ADVANTAGE
the steelhead.8 3 The NFMS sea lion predators, such as killer
whales, sharks, and polar bears, into the Ballard Locks area of
urban Seattle.
There is a multitude of problems with this measure. Besides
the legal (Marine Mammal Protection Act and NEPA) and logisti-
cal problems with the capture and survival of the predators, it
would not be feasible to keep such predators in the area. If they
did stay, they would likely also prey on steelhead thereby exacer-
bating the predation problem. Large sharks, if they survived cap-
ture and transfer to the Locks, could jeopardize public safety.
Given the problems with this measure, it does not warrant further
consideration.8 4
The "hormonal injection" alternative, like the polar bear op-
tion mentioned above, was turned down, but in a reasoned and
convincing way. This measure would involve stimulating the sea
lions to begin their southward migration several months earlier by
changing the sea lions' hormonal balance through the use of repro-
ductive hormones. The hormones would alter the animal's physio-
logical state, thereby stimulating the animal's preparation for the
breeding season. Use of hormones on wild sea lions is untested
and is uncertain whether it would result in the desired behavioral
change, NMFS declared. This technique also could be combined
with a relocation program whereby the sea lion's hormonal bal-
ance would be changed to increase the probability that the animal
would migrate back to their breeding area in Southern California.
Testing with captive animals would be necessary before this tech-
nique is applied to wild animals. This measure could also raise
concerns in California due to the early return of sea lions.8 5
Hondo never lived to see the hormone experiment. He surely
did not regret missing his opportunity to test the tolerance of
Californians with an early and untimely return. Throughout his
life, Hondo received ample due process from the fractious group of
twenty-one people that NMFS convened as its Pinneped-Fishery
Interaction Task Force. In the middle of this was Seattle District
Engineer Colonel Tim Wynn, operator of the Ballard Locks, who
endured the indignities of these proceedings with the weary resig-
83. Compare National Marine Fisheries Service, Washington Department of Fish
and Wildlife, Environmental Assessment on Protecting Winter-run Wild Steelhead
from Predation by California Sea Lions ( Jan. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 SEA LION-
STEELHEAD ASSESSMENT], with id. at 76.
84. See TUDGE at 75-76.
85. See id.
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nation of a man born 100 years too late. Here was a figure tem-
peramentally suited to ride the Palouse with Colonel George
Wright and grapple with Indians like the ferocious Qulchen-a
"tiger" of a man-it took six men to subdue.8 6 Yet, here he was in
the late twentieth century, presiding at the trial of a sea lion; and
being assailed, no less, with sassy questions from environmental-
ists about the dysfunctions of the Corps' own Locks and the fail-
ings of the fish ladders that had served as a model for the great
engineering success at Bonneville.
4. Adaptive Mismanagement
The NMFS staffers and their partners systematically rolled
through the options that would save the fish and keep the sea
lions alive. The sea lions defeated every strategy aimed their way.
They strengthened the admiration of their defenders while they
reinforced the resentments of their detractors. In the process,
they gave us an excellent case study in how adaptive management
can be applied adroitly to questions that never should have been
asked (See Graphic 6,87 "Adaptive Management and Sea Lions").
With the problem defined as sea lions preying on steelhead at
the Locks, adaptive management thus was let loose. The manag-
ers attempted to deter the sea lions with "seal bombs." But the
clever respondents learned to dive to depth when the missiles en-
tered the water. All that resulted from the failed experiment was
the sea lions returning to the surface and picking up the strug-
gling fish "incidentally" stunned by the "seal bombs."
The managers then sought to isolate the fish mingling at the
mouth of the Locks with variously designed "entanglement nets."
These were brushed aside by various "over, under and through"
strategies that required little exertion from these 500-800 pound
marine acrobats. The managers also ran "test aversion" experi-
ments with chemically contaminated steelhead. The sea lions
quickly learned to reject the proffer of dead fish from people in
yellow suits.
The managers introduced a ten-inch mesh "sea lion barrier"
that would allow the steelhead to pass, but not the sea lions. Un-
fortunately the steelhead did not know about this advantage; no
one could make them aware of it, so they shied away from the ten-
86. See WILLIAM COMPTON BROWN, THE INDIAN SIDE OF THE STORY 292, 302
(1961).
87. Copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Review.
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inch mesh as they might from a one-inch mesh. They were
trapped there by the sea lions as efficiently as they could have
been against a fine brick wall.
Increases in the degrees of violence made no difference. The
managers turned to sea lion "anesthetics," and killed a few. How-
ever, the managers soon learned that dose-response rates derived
from bears do not apply to marine mammals on a weight-for-
weight basis. They turned to trapping the sea lions, putting them
in trucks, and removing them to the Pacific Coast, only to learn
that the animals returned rapidly to the Ballard Locks. One of
the returnees was Rapid Rudy, whose feats received immediate
consideration for North American marine mammal speed records.
Next came a serious removal strategy. It was aimed, as all
effective removals are, not at individually identifiable candidates
but at those who could be found and captured. Six of the animals
were trapped at the Locks, trucked to southern California in the
face of objections under the Coastal Zone Management Act, and
released some 2000 miles from the forbidden waters of Puget
Sound. Even this sea lion version of the Oklahoma territory was
not sufficiently distant. Three sea lions returned in a matter of
months. Two disappeared. One compromised by taking up resi-
dence in the Columbia River.88
The sea lions at the Locks were attacked with "Bear Stingers"
shot from crossbows. The sea lions met this strategy with hasty
dives that created wicked ricochets as missiles glanced off the sur-
face of the water. Lawyers, with recurring nightmares of
wounded schoolchildren "incidentally" caught in the crossfire at
the Locks, called off the campaign.
88. Compare 1995 SEA-LION-STEELHEAD ASSESSMENT at 63 ("Of the thirty-seven
sea lions captured between February 17, 1989 and April 19, 1989 and released on the
outer coast, twenty-nine were subsequently observed back in Puget Sound in about
fifteen days. Twelve of the returning animals were recaptured one or more times and
were relocated each time to the outer Washington Coast;" of the six California sea
lions marked and transported to southern California in 1990, return did not occur
until thirty to forty-five days following release; in April of 1994, three sea lions were
returned to the Channel Islands, never to be seen again; ed. a successful relocation
program?), with id. at 65 ("relocation would not provide a total resolution to the prob-
lem"), and id. at 95 (explaining why the removal and transport of six "problem" sea
lions in 1990 did not solve the predation problem: "this increase in predation was not
due to replacement by new animals, it was because not all of the 'problem' sea lions
that had been observed eating steelhead during the season were captured"). Thus the
"best available science" is made to work: When the bad-actor hypothesis is contra-
dicted by empirical evidence, the problem is redefined by expanding the definition of
the bad actor.
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Then came the 220 decibels of sound in the hearing range of
the sea lions-truly painful to the ones not already deaf. But
more painful yet to the managers was the sight of Hondo, re-
turning to the scene. Although obviously distressed by the noise,
he succeeded in defeating it by the simple tactic of staying in tur-
bulent water.
5. Protective Custody
In the spring of 1995, Hondo was physically captured and de-
tained for two months in a facility near Tacoma. To avoid im-
printing, he had no human contact, a deprivation he did not
noticeably regret. He was fed by remote control. The NMFS took
pictures of him with mouth agape, beneath the chute of herring
being refueled like a great tanker. He gained 120 pounds during
captivity, and grew into what staffers describe as the most awe-
some sea lion they had ever seen. The literature speaks of mon-
ster California sea lions, weighing in at 800 to 900 pounds. Hondo
tipped the scales at a svelte 1100 pounds.
Hondo had one jail break to his credit. He broke through the
fence in a school yard and added to his legend with a forceful dis-
play of defiance. Hondo fought for his life and freedom tirelessly
and with great tenacity. He deserves to be admired.
6. Life Without Parole
The adaptive management options ran out for Hondo in the
spring of 1996 with the steelhead at an all-time low and official
patience nearly expired. The state got its permit to kill five of
these "identifiable" pinnipeds. But nobody shot Hondo. This is
the age of win-win compromise. Even vindictive judgments are
cautiously executed.
So Hondo was captured once again, together with Bob and Big
Frank. He was placed aboard a Federal Express cargo jet for a
new home at Sea World of Florida in Orlando. A Sea World man-
ager said this was a lovely spot: "It has a large body of water and
rock work the animals can haul out on and there is a wave gener-
ating machine."8 9
Removal is always a better strategy than murder. It is
cleaner, every bit as effective, and history takes responsibility.
Oregon's first Governor, Joseph Lane, knew this when he pushed
89. Darrell Glover, See You at Sea World: Sea lions jet to new home today, SEAT-
TLE POST-INTELLIGENCEI, May 29 1996, at Bi.
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for removing the Indians from the Willamette Valley. The fish au-
thorities knew this when they won their small removal victory at
the Ballard Locks.
Within a year, Hondo was dead at Sea World, unsustained
even by the wave machine. But he had the best of care. No scien-
tist could say that he died for want of freedom. And he certainly
did not die in vain. The fish mangers already see signs of recovery
in the Ballard steelhead run,90 although the reasons for improve-
ment remain unknown. It might have been the underwater trans-
mitters, or a fake plastic orca brought into the area, or the
removals, but fish passage at the Locks is no longer exploited by
opportunistic sea lions. Many see this as validation of the "bad
actor" sea lion theory.
This "Hershel Law" is no ancient and misshapen thing. It is
no dead hand of past that constrains the better judgments of con-
temporaries. It is thoroughly modern-in its focus on symptoms, in
its substitution of technique for judgment, in its service to the
darker instincts that blame-fixing requires.
IV. Conclusion
Reading the geology of environmental law is not an easy task.
Truths can be hidden, buried, accreted over, and twisted under.
Illusions can be pushed to the surface, strengthened by transfor-
mation, and revealed by accident, but the process is run by law-
yers. There is always room for their self-deceptions and
rationalizations. However, there is room, too, for their creative
rushes and constructive innovations.
90. See Dee Norton, Fewer Sea Lions Mean More Trout at Locks, SEATTLE TIMES,
Feb. 18, 1997, at B1; see also Scott Sunde, Steelhead Run Looks Good at the Locks,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 17, 1997, at B1.
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Attachment 1. Strategies for Defeating Environmental Laws
Neglect. The practice of agencies to disregard or ignore
laws or regulations that promise no contempo-
rary advantage.
Diversion. The tendency of lawmakers to create islands of
specialty that are immune from generally appli-
cable laws and operate independently of cus-
tomary oversight mechanism.
Acquisition and Sale.
Abandonment.
Process Transforma-
tion.
Exception.
Pretense.
Marginalization.
The practice of agencies to trade legal advan-
tage for an asset that is valued more highly or is
susceptible to characterization as affording suf-
ficient restitution for the loss.
The practice of agencies to relinquish enforce-
ment of laws shown by experience to be exces-
sively costly in terms of resource allocation,
political retaliation, or staff or public disaffec-
tion.
The tendency of courts and agencies to read
environmental laws as prescribing decision
processes rather than outcomes. This practice
is fed by win-win ideologies and slows adaptive
legislation responses that would ensue if clear
winners were identified.
The exclusion of a particular regime from a gen-
erally applicable law. Occasions for exception
are greatly enhanced by incremental, duplici-
tous, and fractured lawmaking that multiples
the legal margins where choice of inclusion and
exclusion are made.
The practice of lawmakers to announce goals,
profess principles and proclaim outcomes that
are without adequate means of implementation.
The practice of lawmakers to focus on symp-
toms rather than causes and to prescribe elabo-
rate legal regimes for addressing the symptoms.
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